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ABSTRACT 
 
Emily Adams Given 
On Transparency: A Response to Nishi Shah’s “How Truth Governs Belief” 
(Under the direction of Geoffrey Sayre-McCord) 
 
In his 2003 paper “How Truth Governs Belief” Nishi Shah claims that within first 
personal doxastic deliberation, one cannot separate the questions whether to believe some 
proposition p and whether p is true; the questions must be viewed as answered by and 
answerable to the same set of considerations. He calls this phenomenon transparency, and 
argues that the only way to explain it is by understanding the concept of belief as being 
normatively tied to truth. In deliberating about whether to believe we exercise our 
concept of belief, appreciate it’s normative connection to truth, and so incite the collapse 
of these two questions.   
By way of offering a response to Shah, I argue on behalf of teleological accounts 
of belief that there is a competing explanation of transparency. Despite Shah’s dilemma, 
it seems to me that the teleologist, making metaphysical rather than conceptual claims, 
can recover an explanation of why truth is normative for belief in the way transparency 
reveals. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Some fairly ordinary observations seem to suggest that there is a relationship, 
perhaps even a strong and important one, between belief and truth. For example, to 
believe something seems to be to believe that it’s true. Beliefs are a kind of propositional 
attitude, and what it is to take up a propositional attitude is to take up an attitude towards 
the truth of some proposition. When you believe, or imagine, or assume that p, what 
you’re doing is believing, or imagining, or assuming that p is true. It seems, plainly put, 
that to believe some proposition p either just is or somehow involves believing the 
proposition p is true. If this is so, then adding the truth predicate to the content of your 
belief is redundant; you can’t add to your belief that p the further belief that p is true,
since p is true and p are, in terms of content, one and the same, or make the same 
assertion. This line of thought might be taken to reveal that belief and truth are connected 
as follows: believing that p is, or involves, believing that p is true.
This first thought ought to be enough to make plausible that beliefs and truth bear 
some relationship to one another, namely the relationship that truth bears to propositional 
attitudes in general. It does not as yet, however, make plausible that there is some 
relationship that truth bears to beliefs in particular. Again, the truth predicate is redundant 
not just in the case of beliefs but also with other propositional attitudes: to assume that p
is to assume that p is true, and to imagine that p is to imagine that p is true. Is there some 
additional relationship, then, one that is distinctive of belief? 
2You might think that one difference between beliefs and other propositional 
attitudes is what we have reason to do with respect to them upon discovery of the truth of 
some proposition. Another natural thought to have about beliefs and truth that might 
make you think this is that in trying to figure out what we should believe, we should 
respond in certain ways to discoveries about truth. Put simply, a proposition’s being true 
or false seems to have something important to do with whether we should believe it.  
Consider, for example, the fact that we seem to modify or correct the beliefs of 
others by launching considerations about truth. A friend, espousing the plausibility and 
consequences of some belief she has, which you know to be a false belief1, is 
appropriately replied to in something like the following fashion: “Don’t believe that; it 
isn’t true.” The naturalness of this reply, it seems to me, makes quite plausible the idea 
that belief and truth are deeply connected. After all, your claim about the falsity of your 
friend’s belief is put forth not simply alongside your claim that she shouldn’t believe it, 
but also as somehow relevant to your claim that she shouldn’t. Your claim that her belief 
is false is presented as a reason for her to not believe it.  
Notice that this consideration suggests that there’s a relationship truth bears to 
beliefs that it does not similarly bear to other propositional attitudes. Investigations and 
claims about truth seem irrelevant to whether or not one should imagine or assume that 
something is so, whereas they seem directly relevant to whether or not one should believe 
it. One wouldn’t normally reply to a friend who reported that she’s imagining something 
 
1 I will be using the locutions of ‘a false belief’ and ‘a true belief.’ If we want to say that strictly speaking 
beliefs themselves aren’t true or false but rather the contents of beliefs, or the propositions they take, are 
true or false, then it seems fine for the time being to read these locutions as synonymous with ‘a belief the 
content of which is false’ and ‘a belief the content of which is true.’  
3by saying: “Don’t imagine that; it isn’t true.” Generally put, truth is somehow relevant to 
settling questions about what we should believe.  
We need not, and perhaps ought not, focus on third-personal cases of belief 
evaluation or modification to see the point here. Consider what you do when you ask 
yourself the question whether to believe some proposition p, and how it relates to the 
discovery of truth of p. If you are deliberating about the question of whether to believe p,
it seems that discovering the truth of p puts an end to the deliberation. When you discover 
that p is true, you settle the question of whether to believe it, and do so in the affirmative. 
Imagine, for instance, that you’re wondering if there’s a beer in the fridge, asking 
yourself whether to believe that there’s a beer in the fridge. In some fashion or other, you 
find out that it’s true that there is a beer in the fridge. Surely, this discovery conclusively 
settles that indeed, you should believe that there’s a beer in the fridge. 
 If the discovery of the truth of some proposition gives us reason, maybe even 
decisive reason, to believe it (and its falsity reason not to) as the above suggests, we 
might wonder what the question of whether to believe p has to do with truth in cases 
where we haven’t been so lucky as to discover the truth or falsity of p.
We might extend the previous thought and say the following: deliberating about 
whether to believe p simply collapses into deliberating about whether p is true. When we 
are trying to settle this first question, the considerations we take to be relevant are exactly 
those we take to be relevant to settling the second. This is an extension of the previous 
thought in the following sense: not only is the claim that truth is relevant to settling 
deliberative questions about whether to believe, but further that only truth is relevant. 
Whatever considerations we take to count in favor or against the truth of p we so take to 
4count in favor or against whether to believe p, and to the same extent. When deliberating, 
the questions whether to believe p and whether p is true are answered by and answerable 
to the same set of considerations. It seems to follow from such a thought that when we 
find ourselves in impoverished epistemic circumstances, unable for whatever reason to 
discern the truth or falsity of p, then the way we answer the deliberative question about 
whether to believe p follows suit: to whatever degree we are decided or undecided about 
one question, so too we are undecided about the other.  
 Perhaps an example will serve to make this idea a bit more vivid. Imagine that 
you’re asking yourself whether to believe that your partner has lied to you. You think, 
‘Well, all the evidence shows that she has lied. But that makes me so sad to believe, so 
instead I should believe that she hasn’t.’ Your second thought seems to be at best a bit 
weird. What’s relevant to settling the question about whether you should believe that she 
has lied is whether or not it’s true that she has lied; your ensuing sadness isn’t relevant 
and it seems that nothing but considerations relevant to truth could be. Your sadness 
might give you a reason to get yourself to believe that she hasn’t lied, but it doesn’t give 
you a reason to believe it; only evidence can do that. Similarly, if you had absolutely no 
evidence at all, no considerations which told in favor or against the truth of the claim that 
your partner has lied, you would have no proper reason to believe or disbelieve it.   
 If even some of these phenomena sound legitimate, then it suggests that there’s a 
relationship between belief and truth. What about that relationship explains these 
phenomena? What can we say about beliefs to make sense of the fact that truth seems to 
have some particular kind of relevance to them? 
5The central claim of Nishi Shah’s “How Truth Governs Belief”2 is that the 
phenomenon described above can only be explained by understanding the relationship 
between belief and truth as being conceptual and normative. The reason we collapse our 
considerations of whether to believe and whether true, Shah’s story goes, is that when 
we’re deliberating about whether to believe, we exercise our concept of belief. In so 
doing, we recognize a conceptual truth about beliefs, namely that they’re subject to a 
norm which prohibits believing that p unless p is true. So long as we’re conceiving of 
what we’re trying to form as being a belief, we have dispositions to be moved only by 
alethic considerations activated, since the norm for beliefs makes determining whether p 
imperative. Shah’s claim, then, is that it’s the concept of belief that explains our collapse 
of the questions whether to believe p and whether p, the phenomenon he calls 
transparency. We collapse considerations of whether to believe into considerations of 
whether true in all cases of deliberating about whether to believe since these are all cases 
where we exercise the concept of belief and in so doing, we appreciate that it’s a concept 
normatively tied to truth in a way that requires the collapse. According to Shah, part of 
what it is to do anything that would count as deliberating about one’s own beliefs 
requires and thereby explains the phenomenon in question. 
Establishing Shah’s claim that only a conceptual truth about beliefs could explain 
transparency of course requires rejecting the other putative explanation that Shah takes 
up, namely one generated by a teleologist about beliefs. One might think, after all, that 
what explains transparency is not something about the concept of belief, but rather 
something about what beliefs are supposed to do. A teleological account of beliefs, 
roughly, is one that claims that beliefs are aimed at truth, or have the telos or goal or 
 
2 Shah, Nishi. “How Truth Governs Belief.” The Philosophical Review. 112:4. 447-82 (2003). 
6function of representing the world truly. If the aim of belief is truth, then some 
explanation of why it should be that we take only considerations of truth to be relevant to 
settling questions about whether to believe seems to be on the horizon: considerations 
about truth are those that I take to be relevant when deliberating about a belief because 
they’re the ones that help my belief achieve it’s aim or do what it’s supposed to do. We 
can understand the teleologist’s claim that beliefs aim at the truth as having the status of a 
metaphysical truth rather than a conceptual one: it’s something made true by things we 
might have come to find out about beliefs, not something made true by our concept of 
belief. In this respect, her claim is quite different from Shah’s.  
Shah thinks that this difference renders the teleological explanation implausible: 
the teleologist, he thinks, will not be able to say what it is for a belief to be aimed at truth 
in such a way that allows her both to explain transparency and to say that there is such a 
thing as wishful believing. While significantly more attention will be paid to this below, 
Shah’s dilemma for the teleologist is roughly the following: she can, on one hand, claim 
that what it is to be aimed at truth, or to have the belief-constituting disposition, is to be 
causally responsive to considerations about truth and only those, in which case she can 
explain transparency, but she is left with the implausible consequence that any belief 
which has been causally affected by a consideration other than those relevant to truth is 
not in fact a belief after all. On the other hand, the teleologist instead could weaken the 
belief-constituting disposition and claim that what it is to be aimed at truth is to be 
causally responsive to considerations about truth and perhaps other considerations as 
well; while this will allow her to call cases of wishful believing genuine beliefs, it will 
7leave her unable to explain transparency, a phenomenon in which only truth is taken to be 
relevant. 
One of my central goals in this paper is to show that the teleologist about beliefs 
has better resources for explaining transparency than Shah recognizes. His challenge to 
the teleologist ultimately rests on the charge that she cannot adequately explain the 
normativity that truth exercises over belief with exclusively descriptive metaphysical 
claims. Why should truth always be exclusively relevant if my deliberating about whether 
to believe in no way requires my appreciation of the normativity of truth for belief (as it 
wouldn’t if it were generated by the descriptive, metaphysical claims the teleologist is 
making)? My main claim will be that understanding belief as being conceptually tied to 
truth in the way Shah does offers no better an explanation of the normativity of truth for 
belief, once it’s properly understood, than does the teleologists’ explanation. Though 
Shah’s explanation of why transparency obtains, or why we always appreciate the norm 
tying beliefs to truth, may still have virtues that the teleologist’s explanation lacks, I will 
try to show that her situation is not as bleak as Shah makes it out to be.   
In the next three sections, I will do the following: first, I will examine a bit more 
closely what the phenomenon of transparency is on Shah’s view, and how his claim that 
there’s a conceptual truth connecting belief and truth is supposed to explain it. Second, I 
will examine Shah’s argument that the teleologist about belief cannot offer an adequate 
explanation of transparency, his so-called teleologist’s dilemma. Third, I will offer a 
response on behalf of the teleologist by sketching an explanation of transparency that she 
might give, and will trace out what consequences this response has for Shah’s view as it’s 
presented in “How Truth Governs Belief.” 
CHAPTER TWO: TRANSPARENCY AND SHAH’S CONCEPTUAL TRUTH 
 
In the opening pages of “How Truth Governs Belief,” Nishi Shah describes the 
phenomenon that he, attributing the phrase to Richard Moran, calls transparency: 
There is no inferential step involved in moving from “Should I believe that 
p?” to “Is p true?” Within the perspective of first-personal doxastic 
deliberation, that is, deliberation about what to believe, one cannot 
separate the two questions… One cannot settle on an answer to the 
question whether to believe p without taking oneself to have answered the 
question whether p is true… These two questions must be viewed as 
answered by, and answerable to, the same set of considerations. (447) 
 
A first feature of this phenomenon we need to appreciate is its scope of 
application. Shah is making a claim only about what happens within one particular belief-
formation process, namely “first-personal doxastic deliberation.” His initial 
characterization of what constitutes first-personal doxastic deliberation is that it’s 
deliberation about what to believe; as I initially discussed it, it’s what we do when we 
frame our reasoning with the question whether to believe p. Shah goes on to explain that 
what’s required for an instance of doxastic deliberation is something short of explicitly 
posing to oneself the question whether to believe p. He says,  
Deliberation of any kind is framed by a question… This does not mean 
that an agent has to have the question at the forefront of his mind… but 
unless his thinking manifests some recognition that this is the question he 
is trying to answer, his stream of thought would lack the direction or 
purpose required for it to be an instance of deliberation about what to do 
or believe rather than, for example, a stretch of directionless cogitation. 
(466, my emphasis) 
 
9Shah wants to make clear that there may well be belief-formation processes which are 
non-deliberative, cases where we come to have some belief not on the basis of 
deliberating about it but by inadvertently assuming it, or having it entailed by our other 
beliefs, or otherwise. Also, there clearly are varieties of deliberation that are not doxastic, 
cases of deliberation framed by some question other than whether to believe that p. Shah, 
however, takes no position with regard to these cases: his claim that transparency obtains 
is only supposed to hold for cases in which our reasoning is framed, if not explicitly then 
implicitly3, by the question of whether to believe that p.
If cases of doxastic deliberation are the cases about which Shah is making a 
claim, what is it exactly that’s being claimed about them? Recall Shah’s claim above that 
there is a collapse of two questions: in cases of doxastic deliberation, the questions 
whether to believe p and whether p is true “must be viewed as answered by, and 
answerable to, the same set of considerations” (447). Another way Shah sometimes puts 
it is by saying that doxastic deliberation has an essentially alethic structure. Any 
consideration one takes to be relevant to the question of whether p is true must also be 
taken to be relevant to the question of whether to believe p and vice versa.  
 Shah seems to take it that the plausibility of the claim that this phenomenon 
occurs can be appreciated to at least some extent just by reflecting on one’s own 
deliberation about some belief or other. Let’s return to my lying partner example4:
suppose that you want to figure out whether or not you should believe that your partner 
has lied to you. You explicitly pose to yourself the question whether to believe it. Several 
 
3 While it might be interesting to examine what constitutes the implicit framing of one’s reasoning with 
some question, I take it that for the time being, the vague idea that it occurs whenever what we’re guided 
by trying to answer this question will suffice. 
4 I take it that my lying partner example is an analogue of Shah’s cuckholded husband example (p.453-7, 
465). 
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considerations come to your mind. One consideration is that you take yourself have 
overwhelming evidence that it’s true that she’s lied. Another consideration is that it will 
make you very sad to believe that she’s lied. The phenomenon in question is as follows: 
you take the first consideration to be relevant to whether to believe it (you’ve taken it to 
be relevant to whether it’s true), and take the second consideration to be irrelevant to 
whether to believe it (you take considerations about whether it makes you sad to be 
entirely irrelevant to whether it’s true). There is no inferential step between your taking 
some consideration to be relevant to truth and your taking it to be relevant to whether to 
believe it.  
 It might be useful to make explicit the two ways Shah might respond to apparent 
counterexamples to the phenomenon in question. After all, it seems to me that it wouldn’t 
be ridiculous to reply, “Sometimes, perhaps even quite frequently, I take considerations 
other than those I take to be relevant to truth to be relevant to questions about whether to 
believe something. My religious beliefs, for example, are essentially this way.” Both 
ways Shah might respond to this kind of claim basically rest on reminding us of the 
limited scope of application transparency is supposed to have. If we want to maintain that 
transparency is a legitimate phenomenon, then either we can say that the kind of doxastic 
attitude this person is taking up is not in fact belief (but rather, perhaps, faith), or we can 
say that she hasn’t brought the belief under the scope of doxastic deliberation (but rather 
arrived at her belief non-deliberatively). Indeed it seems plausible in this case to reply to 
such an interlocutor by saying, “Well, yes, but what you’re doing there isn’t really 
believing, strictly speaking. You’re deliberating about whether to have faith rather than 
whether to believe.” Whether or not these two strategies will suffice for all apparent 
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counterexamples is a question I will turn to in some more detail below, but I hope that 
briefly highlighting them is enough to make the phenomenon plausible in the face of 
some immediately obvious apparent counterexamples such as the case of religious belief.  
 The phenomenon that Shah claims occurs, then, might be summarized as follows: 
whenever we’re genuinely engaging in doxastic deliberation, deliberation guided by the 
question of whether to believe p, we take all and only those considerations we take to be 
relevant to truth to be relevant in settling on an answer. We might think of this 
phenomenon as Shah’s explanandum, that which he claims calls for explanation.  
 Shah’s central claim is that transparency is to be explained by a particular 
conceptual truth about beliefs which connects them to truth. He first puts the claim as 
follows: “exercising the concept of belief involves accepting that in some sense one 
ought to believe that p only if p is true” (449). A condition on possession of the concept 
of belief, Shah thinks, is acceptance of a certain prescription as framing one’s 
deliberation about whether to believe p, namely the prescription to believe p only if p is 
true. Shah introduces this claim as follows:  
By framing [one’s own] deliberation as answering to the question whether 
to believe p, a disposition to be moved by considerations that he regards as 
relevant to the truth of p and a disposition blocking considerations that he 
regards as irrelevant to the truth of p are activated. That is, part of 
possessing the concept of belief involves being disposed in this way when 
one applies the concept to frame one’s reasoning. (467) 
 
He says also,  
My proposal is that the dispositions constitutive of possessing the concept 
of belief, and of seeking to answer a question framed with that concept, 
are responsible for the fact that only truth-regarding considerations move 
an agent in such deliberation. (468) 
 
12 
 
Shah’s picture seems to be this: when we engage in doxastic deliberation, we exercise or 
apply our concept of belief to our reasoning, and our concept of belief is such that we 
recognize the force of a prescription to believe p only if it’s true that p whenever we’re 
deliberating about whether to believe it.  
Transparency, we might say, is the consciously felt authority of this prescription 
over our deliberation, a prescription generated by the concept of belief and recognized in 
virtue of our inevitable exercise of this concept in doxastic deliberation. Shah describes 
how making a conceptual claim about belief explains transparency:  
A competent user of the concept of belief must accept the prescription to 
believe that p only if p is true for any activity that he conceives of as 
belief-formation. Because one accepts this prescription insofar as one is 
deliberating about whether to believe that p, determining whether p is true 
will be immediately imperative, to the exclusion of any other question, for 
anyone who entertains the deliberative question whether to believe that p.
(470) 
 
What explains transparency is the concept of belief: accepting a prescription that in effect 
requires transparency, or makes it imperative, goes hand in hand with possessing the 
concept of belief and exercising it in our deliberation. 
We might think about the features of transparency that Shah thinks need 
explanation in terms of its strength in two respects. Transparency evidences not a partial 
collapse of considerations taken to be relevant to two questions, but rather a complete 
collapse; and further, it occurs in not just some cases of doxastic deliberation, but in all of
them. You might think, as Shah seems to, that making a conceptual claim about beliefs is 
well suited to explain these two respects in which transparency is a strong phenomenon. 
The inescapability of this collapse, the reason it occurs in all cases of doxastic 
deliberation, is the inescapability of conceptual necessity; nothing that worked otherwise 
13 
 
could count as doxastic deliberation. The completeness of the collapse, the reason we 
take truth to be exclusively relevant, is that possession of the concept of belief involves 
appreciating a norm that ties it exclusively to truth.  
 Shah claims that the “conceptual truth about belief [that explains transparency] is 
a normative truth” (469). In the above, I’ve already alluded to part of what this seems to 
mean. What we appreciate about the concept of belief when we apply it to our reasoning 
about whether to believe, and what thereby generates the phenomenon of transparency, is 
a particular prescription, or directive, or norm that applies to beliefs. More specifically, 
what we appreciate is that we, or our beliefs, are somehow subject to that norm. I take it 
that Shah is elaborating this point when he says the following:  
The hypothesis that applying the concept of belief to one’s thinking 
involves an acceptance of truth as that to which one’s thinking must 
conform can account for the unique normative standing of evidence for 
belief. I suggest that we think of the prescription that one accepts in 
framing one’s deliberation about whether to believe that p in terms of an 
objective norm. The objective norm of belief prohibits believing that p
unless p is true. But since we cannot directly check our representations 
against the truth, we need subjective norms by which to guide our doxastic 
activities. The role of the objective norm, whose acceptance is expressed 
in the phenomenon of transparency, is to provide a standard of success for 
subjective norms of good evidence that an agent can directly apply in his 
doxastic deliberation. (471) 
 
Shah’s overall story, then, is that when engaging in doxastic deliberation, we frame our 
reasoning with the question of whether to believe p. This requires exercising the concept 
of belief, and if we have the concept of belief, we recognize that it’s a concept that 
involves an objective norm that prohibits believing p unless p is true. So long as we’re 
conceiving of that about which we’re deliberating as a putative belief, we accept this 
norm, and thereby intend to conform to the prescription to believe p only if p is true. This 
activates a disposition to be moved by alethic considerations and a disposition to be 
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unmoved by non-alethic considerations. These dispositions being activated, we get 
transparency: we take all and only those considerations we take to be relevant to truth to 
be those that are relevant to whether to believe.  
 I take myself to have described what the phenomenon of transparency is supposed 
to be according to Shah, and how his claim that there is a conceptual connection between 
belief and truth is supposed to explain it. While I haven’t explicitly addressed Shah’s 
argument that only a conceptual truth could explain transparency, it should be clear why 
he thinks a conceptual truth would be well-suited as an explanation, namely because it 
would tell us something about what it is to be a belief and thereby would explain why 
beliefs working in the way transparency reveals can’t fail.
CHAPTER THREE: SHAH’S DILEMMA FOR THE TELEOLOGIST 
 
Shah sometimes describes his view as an elaboration on the insightful claim that 
truth is the standard of correctness for belief. According to Shah, the claim that truth is 
the standard of correctness for belief is best interpreted in the following fashion: the 
intentions of any agent who can be said to be engaging in deliberation about whether to 
believe that p must be informed by truth as a standard of correctness to which she 
subjects her reasoning. Such deliberation requires an appreciation of features of the 
concept of belief that require our intentions to be so informed, they require that we 
collapse our considerations in the manner described by transparency. Thus, it is these 
features of the concept of belief that explain transparency. 
 There is, however, another way of interpreting the claim that truth is the standard 
of correctness for belief. The teleologist about beliefs might claim that truth is a standard 
of correctness for belief in the sense that beliefs have the aim or goal of getting at truth. I 
put forth this claim about the aim of belief not as a mere expression or rearticulation of 
the norm that beliefs must be true in order to be correct, but rather as a fact about beliefs 
which is supposed to generate and explain this norm. “One can explain how there exists a 
norm of correctness for belief by turning to the fact that belief aims at the truth” (459, my 
emphasis)5. The teleologist could account for the normative relationship between belief 
 
5 This is Shah’s description of David Velleman’s version of the teleological claim. 
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and truth that transparency seems to reveal, then, by elaborating on this claim that truth is 
the aim of belief, or its telos, purpose, or goal.  
Entities can have goals generated for them in various ways; Shah lists what he 
takes to be the most obvious ways and includes “intentions, intelligent design (which may 
reduce to intention), and evolutionary selection” (459). A watch, for example, seems to 
have the goal of representing the time in virtue of some facts about its design and the 
intentions of those of us who create and use watches. A heart, for example, seems to have 
the goal of pumping blood in virtue of some facts about how they were selected for in the 
evolution of those creatures who have them. Analogously, beliefs, the teleologist wants to 
say, have the goal of truth, or representing the world truly and “just as a goal provides the 
one who has it with motivation to pursue means to its obtainment, so too on this view 
truth serves as a goal that motivates a believer to strive to attain it” (459).  
The explanation of transparency that a teleologist about belief might give, then, 
would be something like the following: because as a matter of metaphysical fact, beliefs 
aim at the truth, there is a norm governing their behavior, a norm that governs their 
success with respect to this aim. This norm makes considerations that are relevant to truth 
relevant to deliberative questions about whether to believe some proposition in the way 
that transparency reveals. Shah explains that on the teleological view,  
Belief’s standard of correctness expresses the measure of success that a 
belief must achieve in order to obtain its goal. This measure of success 
then determines which types of considerations constitute reasons for 
belief; they are whichever considerations lead one in the direction of 
success in obtaining the goal of belief, truth. Normally the way that 
considerations point one in the direction of truth is by being indications of 
truth, that is, by constituting evidence (of truth). (459) 
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Any explanation of transparency that the teleologist is going to give will involve the 
claim that beliefs aim at the truth, and will then tell a story about how this fact about 
beliefs generates a norm whose acceptance generates the particular fact about our 
deliberation about beliefs that transparency reveals. As I will try to show, the real 
challenge for the teleologist will be explaining how it is that the existence of some norm 
tying beliefs to truth comes to be accepted within doxastic deliberation in the sense that 
transparency reveals. 
 Let us try to get a bit more precise, then, about what it is that the teleologist 
means when she says that beliefs aim at the truth; what is it to “aim at truth” in the 
relevant sense? Early in his discussion of the teleologist, Shah says that “the teleologist 
interpreted the analogy [to other aim-constituted activities] as showing that belief is a 
state that is constitutively regulated by an intention to accept the truth, or some surrogate 
of such an intention” (465). Being regulated by such an intention, Shah seems to think, 
will be a matter of having some disposition to be causally influenced by truth. He 
attributes to the teleologist the “descriptive claim that belief is causally regulated by 
truth-regarding considerations” (448). This seems to be what the teleologist’s 
interpretation of the claim that truth is the standard of correctness for belief essentially 
amounts to. For Shah’s teleologist, aiming at the truth ultimately boils down being 
causally responsive to, or causally influenced by, truth-regarding considerations. 
 Shah understands the teleologist’s claim that beliefs aim at the truth as being 
appropriately cashed out in terms of being causally responsive to truth-regarding 
considerations; this understanding gives rise Shah’s dilemma for the teleologist. Shah 
wants to show that the teleologist about beliefs has no plausible explanation of 
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transparency. He argues that the teleologist cannot spell out exactly how strong this 
“belief-constituting disposition” to be causally responsive to truth is in such a way that 
both explains transparency and makes room for the existence of beliefs that are caused by 
non-alethic considerations. He initially describes the two horns of his dilemma as 
follows: 
On one horn, the teleologist must allow the disposition that constitutes 
aiming at truth to be so weak as to allow paradigm cases in which beliefs 
are caused by such non-evidential processes as wishful thinking, in which 
case he cannot capture the exclusive role of evidence in one particular type 
of belief-forming process, reasoning. On the other horn, in order to 
account for the exclusive role of evidence in reasoning about what to 
believe, the teleologist must strengthen the disposition that constitutes 
aiming at truth so that it excludes the influence of non-truth-regarding 
considerations from such reasoning. However, by strengthening the truth-
aimed disposition, the teleologist cannot accommodate the cases of 
wishful thinking, in which non-evidential factors clearly exercise 
influence over belief. (461) 
 
The basic question that Shah’s dilemma centers on, then, is the question of how strong 
the belief-constituting disposition is according to the teleologist. The only way to avail 
herself of a plausible explanation of transparency, Shah argues, is for her to make the 
disposition so strong that it implausibly rules out cases of wishful thinking as beliefs. 
 Another way of thinking about Shah’s dilemma for the teleologist is to think of 
him as presenting the teleologist with two tasks he thinks she cannot jointly discharge: he 
wants the teleologist to explain first why transparency obtains, and second why 
sometimes beliefs are causally affected by things other than truth. Any plausible account 
of beliefs is going to have to leave room for the possibility of cases where our beliefs are 
causally influenced by non-alethic considerations. It seems all too obvious that all too 
often we are caused to have some belief because we engage in wishful thinking of one 
sort or another. With that said, Shah is right to claim that the teleologist about beliefs 
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cannot avail herself of one putative explanation of transparency. The teleologist ought not 
claim that the “belief-constituting disposition to be influenced by truth-regarding factors” 
is so strong such as to rule out the causal influence of any other factor; this would leave 
her forced to say implausibly that any cognitive state produced by non-alethic factors is 
not a belief. Even if such a claim would afford her an explanation of transparency, being 
forced to reject the platitude that sometimes beliefs are causally influenced by non-alethic 
considerations is too high a cost.6
To say that aiming at truth is constituted by a strong disposition of this kind will 
force the teleologist to call anything caused by non-alethic considerations something 
other than a belief, and indeed this is implausible. Shah thinks, then, that the teleologist 
must instead “weaken” the belief-constituting disposition in question and claim instead 
that in order to be a belief a cognitive state need not be causally responsive exclusively to 
alethic considerations, but rather at least somewhat responsive to alethic considerations 
and perhaps to some others as well. To weaken her claim in this way, Shah thinks, will 
allow the teleologist to call cases of wishful believing genuine beliefs, but will leave her 
unable to explain transparency. If being a belief fails to rule out the causal influence of 
non-alethic considerations, then why in one particular belief-forming process, namely 
 
6 It might be worth asking whether or not this strong claim really would afford an explanation of 
transparency. Shah accepts that it would, but this is less than obvious to me. Say the teleologist claimed that 
beliefs are those things that have a disposition to be influenced by truth-regarding factors, a disposition so 
strong such as to rule out the causal influence of any non-alethic consideration: how would she then explain 
transparency? One reason to think that she still couldn’t explain it is the following line of thought: even if 
it’s true that in order to be a belief a thing has to be causally influenced only by alethic considerations, what 
transparency seems to reveal is that we take only alethic considerations to be relevant to settling questions 
about whether to believe some p, which we might fail to do even if the “belief-constituting disposition” 
ruled out the causal influence of anything other than alethic considerations. It’s not clear, then, that the 
teleologist, as thus far construed, could explain transparency even by claiming that the belief-constituting 
disposition is “strong”. 
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doxastic deliberation, do we take alethic considerations as the only ones relevant? As 
Shah puts it:  
Because the teleologist allows that considerations other than evidence can 
influence belief, he has no explanation for why deliberation, being just one 
of many different belief-forming processes, couldn’t be influenced by 
practical considerations through and through. (463)  
 
If all the teleologist says about beliefs is that they aim at the truth in the sense that they 
have a disposition to be causally responsive to considerations about truth, but perhaps to 
all sorts of other considerations as well, then she can’t explain why within doxastic 
deliberation those other sorts are never relevant. 
Shah presents this horn of his dilemma for the teleologist as a variant on G.E. 
Moore’s famous open question argument, a variant he calls the closed question argument. 
Shah takes Moore to have shown that because conceptualizing some situation in purely 
descriptive terms will not settle the question of whether or not it’s good, descriptive 
definitions of ‘good’ will fail, showing that the concept of good is a normative concept. 
Shah wants to use this general line of thought against the teleologist to show that she does 
not have an adequate definition of ‘belief.’ One of the things that transparency reveals, 
Shah thinks, is that “once one has discovered whether p is true, the question whether to 
believe that p is closed” (463). We can test the adequacy of any proposed analysis of 
‘belief’ by asking whether this deliberative question remains closed once we 
conceptualize belief in the way proposed; if it doesn’t, then the proposal fails to capture 
the concept of belief. And in the case of the teleologist, who proposes a descriptive claim 
about beliefs, the question fails to close according to Shah:  
The teleological account before us falls prey to the closed question 
argument, because as we have seen, it is not a closed question whether, 
when asking oneself whether to believe that p, where belief is 
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conceptualized as being weakly responsive to evidence, the issue is 
resolved solely by thinking about whether p is true. (464) 
 
So, while weakening her claim about the disposition that is constitutive of being aimed at 
truth is required in order for the teleologist to salvage the platitude that sometimes beliefs 
are causally influenced by non-alethic considerations, it leaves her subject to the closed 
question argument, unable to explain transparency. 
 Because he thinks that the teleologist has no adequate reply to this dilemma, Shah 
claims that she cannot adequately explain transparency. He diagnoses the overall problem 
with teleological accounts of belief as being that they are making descriptive, 
metaphysical claims rather than normative, conceptual ones. Because the teleologist is 
saying something that is meant to be true of beliefs, but not true of beliefs in virtue of the 
concept of belief, Shah thinks that she won’t be able to explain why any possessor of the 
concept of belief cannot fail to appreciate this truth. He explains that  
If this constitutive truth about belief were merely a metaphysical truth, 
then it would be possible for an agent to fail to appreciate it, and it would 
be possible for the truth about belief to fail to influence his deliberation. 
But transparency is the consciously felt authority of truth for belief in any 
deliberation that aims to settle belief, so transparency can’t be the 
conscious face of a merely metaphysical truth about belief. Transparency 
thus must express a conceptual truth about belief; a truth that an agent 
grasps merely in virtue of treating his deliberation as answering to the 
question of whether to believe that p. (469) 
 
Again, transparency is a strong phenomenon on Shah’s view; he thinks it’s a 
phenomenon that cannot fail to obtain in any case of genuine doxastic deliberation. Shah 
charges that the teleologist’s merely metaphysical claims cannot explain this strength. An 
appreciation of the metaphysical truths about beliefs need not be had by all doxastic 
deliberators, and so cannot be that which explains why all doxastic deliberators behave in 
the way transparency reveals. 
CHAPTER FOUR: DISSOLVING THE DILEMMA 
 
The central problem that Shah thinks the teleologist about beliefs falls prey to is 
an inability to account for the normative status of truth for belief. She cannot explain, he 
thinks, why within doxastic deliberation we always completely collapse our 
considerations of whether to believe into considerations of whether true, since for all the 
teleologist can say about what it is to be a belief, answering the latter question need not 
be necessary or sufficient for answering the former. Recall that on Shah’s reading, the 
teleologist’s claim that beliefs aim at the truth is understood as meaning that beliefs are 
causally regulated by an intention to accept the truth, an intention had just in case one is 
disposed to be causally responsive to alethic considerations. Since this disposition cannot 
be so strong such as to rule out the causal influence of non-alethic considerations (since 
that would render wishful beliefs non-beliefs), the teleologist has no story about why the 
causal influence of non-alethic considerations is precluded within doxastic deliberation, 
or why truth has a unique normative status for beliefs. Why within doxastic deliberation 
is truth exclusively relevant in the way transparency reveals if nothing about beliefs can 
require that they only respond to alethic considerations? 
 The resource that the teleologist needs is one that allows her to claim both that 
sometimes beliefs are causally influenced by non-alethic considerations, and that there’s 
something about beliefs that makes only alethic considerations relevant to settling 
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questions about whether to believe them, something we recognize when engaging in 
doxastic deliberation. The central claim I will make in this section is that in responding to 
a class of putative counterexamples to transparency, Shah himself needs to explain the 
difference between appreciating or applying a norm and constantly conforming to that 
norm, and that once he does so, he is forced to make use of a resource that the teleologist 
can exploit in order to explain the unique normative status of truth for belief.  
Imagine the following case: I ask myself whether to believe p, where p is the 
proposition that my partner has lied to me. I take it that all and only those considerations 
which are relevant to the question whether p is true are those that are relevant to my 
current deliberative question. I appreciate, in other words, that no non-alethic 
consideration counts as a reason to believe p. I appreciate that all my evidence suggesting 
that indeed my partner has lied is relevant to settling my current question, and I 
appreciate that other considerations aren’t.  
 By the description given so far, it seems that I’m experiencing the phenomenon of 
transparency. It seems, though, that all the above could be true of me, and yet 
nevertheless I may be causally influenced by non-alethic considerations in my settling the 
question of whether to believe p. Imagine, to continue with the lying partner example, 
that you appreciate all sorts of evidence for the claim that she has lied; recognizing it as 
evidence (as an alethic consideration), you recognize that it and only it is relevant to your 
question of whether to believe p. However, as a matter of fact, your belief fails to fall in 
line, so to speak, with your alethic considerations. The consideration that it will make you 
miserable to believe p causally affects your belief, preventing it from being formed; it 
does so, further, not because you consciously take this consideration to be relevant (you 
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recognize, in fact, that it’s not). This is a case where despite your appreciation of the 
normativity for truth, you get blindsided by a non-alethic consideration in your belief 
formation. 
 Shah seems to think that the appreciation of the conceptual truth he is after cannot 
fail to move doxastic deliberators in the causal sense, or that those who appreciate the 
normativity of truth for belief cannot fail to be causally impacted by their alethic 
considerations (and cannot at all be causally impacted by non-alethic considerations), at 
least within doxastic deliberation. If this is so, then the case I just described is a violation 
of transparency. For Shah, it seems that there is no way that I can both appreciate that 
only alethic considerations are relevant to settling questions about whether to believe p 
and fail to be causally moved by this appreciation, so long as I stay within the perspective 
of doxastic deliberation. I imagine that what Shah would say about the case I’ve 
described above, then, is that your belief that your partner has not lied is a belief that you 
have formed non-deliberatively7. As long as you continue to be deliberating, you can be 
causally moved only by alethic considerations since you, being a possessor of the concept 
of belief, cannot fail to appreciate the norm of belief which makes imperative that you be 
so moved.  
 We might wonder, though, whether this understanding of transparency is the 
appropriate one. I want to distinguish at least two versions of transparency, one stronger 
than the other. On the first version of transparency, the one elaborated just above which 
Shah at least sometimes espouses, not only do we appreciate the feature of beliefs that 
normatively ties them to truth and intend to conform to the norm, but further we actually 
 
7 Alternatively, Shah could claim that the final doxastic state being deliberated about is not being conceived 
of as a belief. Either way, Shah has got to claim that since this is a case where transparency is violated, 
where non-alethic considerations causally influence belief, it cannot be a case of doxastic deliberation. 
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succeed in so conforming, we actually adjust our dispositions to respond to those 
considerations we take to be alethic successfully, or such that only they causally impact 
the belief in question. On the second and weaker version of transparency, this latter 
component is absent: transparency is a phenomenon that involves an appreciation of the 
normativity of truth for belief, even an intention to conform to the norm, but doesn’t 
require success in so conforming. Some of the considerations I take to be non-alethic may 
have causal impact on my belief, despite my recognition that they are irrelevant to 
settling the question of whether to believe.
The following set of cases seem to show that the appropriate understanding of 
transparency is the weaker one. The later cases are designed to be examples of genuine 
doxastic deliberation where the strong understanding of transparency fails; cases where 
the agent’s reasoning is indeed answerable to considerations taken to be relevant to truth, 
but are in fact answered by (or causally impacted by) considerations taken to be not 
relevant to truth. I will claim that Shah’s forced response to these cases, namely that they 
are non-deliberative belief formation or deliberation about a non-belief, is implausible. If 
this is so and only the weaker version of transparency is what genuinely requires 
explaining, then we will need to revisit the teleologist’s putative explanation and reassess 
it alongside Shah’s. 
 First of all, it seems clear that there are beliefs of the sort that one suddenly, by 
accident, or unintentionally finds herself with. I might find myself believing, for example, 
that my partner hasn’t lied to me, because having this belief makes me feel good. Many 
of our beliefs don’t ever come under the scope of deliberation about the question whether 
to believe them; I have many beliefs, for example, that I have only in the sense that 
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they’re entailed by my other beliefs. I have other beliefs that I simply find myself with, 
ones I acquired in an entirely unconscious fashion, through processes I would be hard 
pressed to identify. In many of these cases it seems that considerations about what’s 
useful, or prudent, or ethically appropriate to believe may have causal influence on my 
resulting beliefs. While it may sound weird when described first personally, it seems that 
we observe these kinds of beliefs in others all the time; when asked why the person holds 
the belief, the reasonable answer is that her desire to believe it, or her prudential need to 
believe it, has caused her to do so.  
Shah certainly wants to maintain that there are cases of this kind, and that they are 
compatible with his claim that transparency obtains in all cases of doxastic deliberation. 
He must, then, claim that these are cases of beliefs formed non-deliberatively, or 
deliberation about non-beliefs. And indeed, since these are cases where it’s not at all clear 
that the individual has set out to frame a stretch of her reasoning with the question 
whether to believe, or that what she has is best described as a belief rather than a working 
assumption, Shah’s response seems appropriate. He is making no claim about those 
beliefs that fail to come under the scope of doxastic deliberation, so these first cases are 
no counterexample to either version of transparency. 
 Secondly, though, there also seem to be cases of wishful believing where the 
individual in question does frame a stretch of her reasoning with the question whether to 
believe. Imagine, for example, that somebody asks you whether you believe that your 
partner has lied. Having never really entertained the question, you set about to form a 
belief, you deliberate about whether to believe that she’s lied. The only considerations 
you take to count in favor of your answering this question in the affirmative are those you 
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take to count in favor of the truth of the claim that she’s lied. You recognize 
considerations that favor of the truth of the claim that she’s lied, and thereby take them to 
be relevant to your belief formation. Nevertheless, at the end of this process, the belief 
you come to simply isn’t the appropriate one; instead, you end up holding the belief that 
your partner has told the truth, or at least are precluded from the belief that she’s lied. 
You might do all the weighing of evidence appropriately, but nevertheless fail to come to 
the appropriate belief.  
 This case is less plausibly responded to as being either non-deliberative or non-
belief, it seems to me. Shah’s response will have to amount to the following: this is a case 
where, if the agent is a possessor of the concept of belief, then perhaps doxastic 
deliberation was going on for some time, where the agent was framing her reasoning with 
the question of whether to believe, but that at some point along the way, she stopped 
deliberating and began engaging in some other belief formation process or began 
deliberating about some other question. While this response would indeed allow Shah to 
make these cases compatible with his claim that transparency obtains within doxastic 
deliberation, it seems to need some independent motivation. It’s not clear, in other words, 
that the agent in this case has stopped engaging in doxastic deliberation: she continues to 
be conceiving of herself as deliberating about a belief, and continues to take the right 
kinds of consideration to be relevant; it’s just that she does a bad job of it. 
 It seems perfectly possible that the sense in which the agent does a bad job is not 
that which Shah’s story has to say it is. Shah could make room for this case and preserve 
a strong understanding of transparency if he could make plausible that what’s going on in 
this case is not that the agent is being causally impacted by some consideration she takes 
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to be non-alethic, but rather that she improperly identifies which considerations are 
alethic. Because she (mistakenly) takes the consideration that it will make her sad to 
believe that her partner has lied to be relevant to the truth of the claim that her partner has 
lied, the fact that this consideration comes to have causal impact on the belief is no threat 
to strong transparency since she’s moved only by those considerations she takes to be 
alethic. However, this description of the case is disingenuous; it seems perfectly possible 
that the agent fully realize that the consideration about her sadness is irrelevant, but that 
despite this recognition it causally impacts the belief in question, perhaps preventing its 
formation. The agent does all the weighing of alethic considerations appropriately, but at 
the last minute has her belief knocked off course, so to speak.  
The following is another example where the appropriate description seems to be 
that an agent is framing her reasoning with the question of whether to believe and 
appreciating that only those considerations relevant to the truth of the belief are relevant 
to answering it, but nevertheless has her belief causally impacted by something non-
alethic. Experiments by Kahneman and Tversky8 have shown that many people, 
including those who are familiar with statistics, are likely to assign a higher probability to 
the claim that some person is a feminist banker, than to the claim that she is a banker, 
given that the subjects are primed by an appropriate story about said person’s character. 
Since it’s impossible for it to be more likely that someone is a feminist banker than that 
she is a banker, something has clearly gone wrong with these people’s beliefs; the 
question is what exactly.  
 
8 Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. The simulation heuristic, In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic and A. Tversky 
(eds.) Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases (pp. 201-208). New York: Cambridge 
University Press. (1982) 
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The interpretation of this case that I want to make plausible is that it’s genuine 
doxastic deliberation engaged in by a possessor of the concept of belief, where she 
recognizes the normativity of truth for belief, intends to conform to it, and just plain does 
a bad job. While arguing explicitly for this would require an analysis of the particular 
study, it seems plausible that the subjects in this study were directed to form, and then 
report, a belief. It seems likely, further, that in so doing they took those considerations 
they took to be alethic as those that were relevant; they understood that the belief they 
were forming was subject to the normativity of truth. However, despite their intention to 
allow only alethic considerations to move them (and even perhaps their taking themselves 
to have succeeded in being so moved) they are nevertheless causally impacted by 
something that they realize, or would realize, is non-alethic.  
It may be difficult, in this case, to specify what exactly the non-alethic 
consideration that causally impacts the belief is. Nevertheless, it seems that some sort of 
heuristic is plausibly at work; rather than weighing what the agent herself takes to be the 
alethic considerations in the fashion the agent herself would endorse (namely by being 
causally impacted only by them), she instead, unbeknownst to her, weighs the 
considerations according to some heuristic that assigns higher relevance to certain 
considerations (plausibly those that are present to her mind) than is appropriate. She does 
this not because she takes this heuristic to be truth-conducive, but rather by mistake. 
Again, Shah does have several possible responses to this case at his disposal. He 
may claim that what’s going on is no violation even of strong transparency: what’s going 
on is that the subjects are mistaking considerations that are in fact non-alethic for alethic 
ones. It’s not that something they take to be non-alethic causally impacts them but rather 
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that at least one of the considerations they take to be alethic is not in fact alethic at all. 
Given that the subjects of the study are familiar with probabilities and statistics, and 
given that it seems likely that if we asked them what kinds of considerations they were 
attending to in forming their beliefs they would answer that it’s those that are relevant to 
the truth of their belief, this response seems implausible. Shah might instead claim that 
the subjects of the study are not deliberating about whether to believe the relevant 
propositions but rather about whether to answer the question they’ve been asked in some 
particular fashion; it’s not a case of deliberation about whether to believe and so 
transparency was never supposed to apply. Again, this seems implausible; it seems 
perfectly possible that the subjects of the study are following their instructions and trying 
to come to a belief which they’ll then report, and even that they appreciate the exclusive 
relevance of alethic considerations in doing so; it’s just that this appreciation fails to 
result in the belief’s being causally influenced only by them. 
The later lying partner case and the Kahneman and Tversky subjects cases are 
ones whose natural description reveals that they violate the strong version of 
transparency. While I recognize that Shah does have resources for responding to these 
cases, all of them seem to stand in need of independent motivation.  
Not only do I find it implausible to call these cases non-deliberative belief-
formation, or deliberation about a non-belief, it’s difficult to see why we should be forced 
to given Shah’s own explanation of transparency. It seems to me that Shah is wrong to 
think that appreciation of the conceptual truth about beliefs that he puts forth could 
explain our constant conformity to this norm within doxastic deliberation. It seems to me, 
in other words, that Shah’s own explanation of transparency is weaker than he thinks if 
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the phenomenon is indeed supposed to require that no non-alethic consideration has 
causal impact on a belief under the scope of doxastic deliberation.  
We might appreciate the norm that governs beliefs and their relation to truth, and 
even have the intention of conforming to the norm, and yet nevertheless fail to do so, 
namely when a non-alethic consideration causally interferes. It seems to be generally true 
of norms that I can appreciate that I’m subject to a norm and be applying that norm to my 
deliberation without always succeeding in conforming to the norm. Even if Shah is right 
that in doxastic deliberation I exercise my concept of belief which is a normative concept, 
a concept of a thing to be had only if true (roughly), and in so doing I intend to conform 
to the prescription to believe p only if p is true, I may nevertheless fail to conform and be 
causally thwarted by a rogue non-alethic consideration in my belief-formation. It’s not 
clear, then, if transparency is to be explained as Shah thinks, why we should be forced to 
diagnose such a case as non-deliberative belief formation or deliberation about a question 
other than whether to believe.
There are at least two reasons, then, to think that the weaker version of 
transparency is the plausible one, the one that genuinely stands in need of explanation. 
Again, the weak version of transparency amounts to appreciating the normativity of truth 
for belief while perhaps succeeding, or perhaps failing, to conform to the norm in such a 
way as to preclude the causal influence of non-alethic considerations recognized as such. 
The first reason is that there seem to be cases where non-alethic considerations have 
causal impact on a belief that nevertheless seems to be under the scope of doxastic 
deliberation performed by a possessor of the concept of belief; we have plausible 
counterexamples, in other words, to strong transparency. The second reason is that if 
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transparency is to be explained as Shah thinks it is, we should expect only the weak 
phenomenon anyway. 
Shah could, of course, concede this point.9 He might agree that what the 
phenomenon of transparency truly reveals is that within doxastic deliberation we always 
appreciate the normativity of truth for belief (we appreciate that beliefs are such that all 
and only those considerations we take to be alethic are relevant to settling questions about 
whether to believe) and that this need not involve always conforming to the norm, in the 
sense of being causally influenced only by alethic considerations.  
Even conceding this revision of transparency, though, Shah might still claim that 
only a conceptual connection between truth and beliefs conceived along his lines can 
explain it. Since the phenomenon still generalizes over all cases of doxastic deliberation 
(what’s true in all of them is an appreciation of the relevant norm), claiming that there’s a 
conceptual normative connection between belief and truth is still well-suited as an 
explanation given our inevitable exercise of the concept of belief in this context. Recall 
that Shah’s charge for the teleologist was in part to account for the normativity of truth 
for belief (in light of her essentially descriptive claims), and in part to account for the 
appreciation of this normativity in all cases of doxastic deliberation (in light of her 
essentially metaphysical claims which, as opposed to Shah’s own conceptual claim, need 
not be appreciated in all these cases). Both of these challenges remain live even once we 
weaken the phenomenon of transparency in the way I’ve suggested; however, at least the 
first of them becomes easier to meet.  
 
9 Shah sometimes seems to appreciate the point and agree that the weaker version of transparency is the 
appropriate one. But because he sometimes talks as though appreciation of the norm he has in mind cannot 
possibly fail to “move” doxastic deliberators (see p. 463, 468), it seems important to make explicit that this 
cannot mean that genuine doxastic deliberation precludes the causal impact of some consideration the agent 
takes to be non-alethic on her belief.   
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The phenomenon of transparency that requires explaining should be understood to 
allow the causal influence of some consideration the agent herself takes to be non-alethic 
but requires an appreciation of the exclusive relevance of alethic considerations in 
settling questions about whether to believe. To begin offering an explanation of this 
phenomenon on behalf of the teleologist about beliefs, recall the teleologist’s central 
claim that beliefs aim at the truth. Again, this claim is supposed to have the status of a 
metaphysical truth: something that is true of all beliefs, not in virtue of the concept of 
belief, but in virtue of facts about those things the concept picks out. Beliefs, on this 
account, have the goal of truth in the same way that hearts have the goal of pumping 
blood. While I don’t want to commit to the particulars of any one view of what it is to 
have a goal of this kind, Ruth Millikan’s theory of proper functions is one teleological 
view according to which what makes it the case that beliefs aim at the truth is roughly 
that beliefs are created and sustained by mechanisms that were selected for in the 
evolutionary history of believers because they actually performed the function of 
representing the truth. Because of this history, beliefs are the kind of thing that have the 
goal or aim of representing truth. Abstracting from this particular view of what it is to 
have a goal or function of this kind, the general idea that a teleological view will involve 
is that there are some descriptive facts about beliefs that generate the goal or aim of 
belief.  
Shah understood the teleologist’s claim that beliefs aim at the truth as getting 
ultimately cashed out in descriptive terms: the “belief-constituting disposition” for the 
teleologist is a matter of being causally regulated by alethic considerations. Shah argued 
that whatever this causal regulation was supposed to be, the teleologist couldn’t give an 
34 
 
account of it that’s weak enough to allow cases where beliefs are causally impacted by 
non-alethic considerations but strong enough to explain transparency, the unique 
normative status of truth for belief within doxastic deliberation. The root of the problem, 
Shah claimed, was that the teleologist was making essentially descriptive claims. If the 
belief-constituting disposition is a matter of being causally regulated by alethic 
considerations, and there’s no way to distinguish in descriptive terms the causal roles that 
alethic and non-alethic considerations play with respect to beliefs, then there’s no way to 
claim that truth is exclusively tied to belief in the way transparency requires us to explain.  
However, while Shah is right that the teleologist is making essentially descriptive 
claims, they are descriptive claims that are explicitly designed to make sense of 
normativity. Shah has given short shrift to the teleologist by conflating what it is to be 
causally regulated in the requisite sense and what it is to be causally impacted or 
influenced; the teleologist needs to say that belief is causally regulated only by truth, 
even if it’s sometimes causally influenced or impacted by something non-alethic. Recall 
Millikan: beliefs aiming at the truth is a matter of their being produced by mechanisms 
that were selected for because they managed to produce states that represent the world 
truly. The belief-constituting disposition, then, can indeed be conceived of as a matter of 
causal regulation by truth, but not in the way Shah seems to understand it. The sense in 
which the teleologist is claiming beliefs are regulated by truth is not that they are causally 
impacted only by truth-relevant considerations. (Shah was right to recognize that this 
claim would force the teleologist to call wishful beliefs non-beliefs.) Rather, causal 
regulation of belief by truth of the kind the teleologist needs to appeal to, while it will 
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involve some degree of causal influence by alethic considerations, will be a matter of the 
unique role that truth has played in the history of beliefs.  
One criterion of adequacy for a teleological account of anything, it seems, is that 
it make possible cases where the entity in question has the function or goal in question 
but fails to perform or live up to it. There are hearts whose goals are to pump blood that 
nevertheless fail to work in such a way as to allow the meeting of this goal. There are 
beliefs, similarly, whose goals are to represent truly, that nevertheless fail to be causally 
impacted in a way that would secure the meeting of this goal. Simply because non-alethic 
considerations can causally influence beliefs, then, does not mean that there isn’t some 
unique role that truth is playing with respect to them. The teleologist can make sense of 
both of the normativity of truth for belief and the existence of cases where non-alethic 
considerations causally impact beliefs, then, just as long as she can cash out the unique 
role that truth has played in the history of beliefs that gives it a unique normative status. 
To cash out this response in more detail, the teleologist would have to make 
plausible that only truth has played this causal regulation role, however exactly it’s going 
to be specified. If it’s understood as ultimately being about what the mechanisms that 
produce beliefs were selected for, then the teleologist would need to make plausible that 
indeed beliefs are had because the mechanisms that produce them were selected for 
because they give rise to beliefs that represent truly, rather than being selected for for 
some other reason. I won’t argue for this claim, but what I want to make clear is that 
given her essentially descriptive claims about belief, the teleologist does have resources 
to make sense of the unique normativity of truth for belief, without requiring that only 
alethic considerations have causal impact on beliefs. The unique normativity of truth for 
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belief is generated by unique role that truth has played in the history of beliefs; that they 
represent truly is the very reason that we have the mechanisms that produce beliefs, so 
beliefs have only truth as their goal. 
The distinction between the stronger and weaker versions of transparency showed 
us that what really requires explaining is not that alethic considerations have exclusive 
causal influence on the settling of the question whether to believe, even within doxastic 
deliberation. Rather, what requires explaining is why alethic considerations are taken to 
be exclusively relevant in all these cases. If the teleologist can cash out her account of 
what it is for beliefs to be aimed at truth in the ways I’ve suggested, then it seems that she 
can account for the unique normative status of beliefs for truth, or why only evidence is 
relevant.  
This task is only part, though, of what Shah charged the teleologist to explain 
about the phenomenon of transparency. What the teleologist needs to explain is both why 
alethic considerations are the only ones we take to be relevant in settling questions about 
whether to believe (why truth is uniquely normative) and also why we possessors of the 
concept of belief always recognize this relevance when engaging in doxastic deliberation 
(why we appreciate this unique normativity of truth). The teleologist’s story, as I’ve 
offered it so far, can account for only truth being relevant for beliefs, since only truth is 
the goal of beliefs; what will be harder for her to account for, though, is why we should 
always appreciate this relevance or normativity within doxastic deliberation. It might well 
be true that beliefs are tied uniquely and normatively to truth, but because this is a matter 
of metaphysics according to the teleologist, we wouldn’t expect to always appreciate this 
simply in virtue of engaging in doxastic deliberation. 
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Even if the teleologist can make sense of the fact that truth is uniquely normative 
for belief, then, it’s not clear that she can make sense of why it is that we always seem to 
appreciate this in cases of doxastic deliberation in the way Shah takes transparency to 
reveal. Let us get clearer, though, about what, according to Shah’s own view, actually 
constitutes appreciation of the norm in question. In arguing for the idea that transparency 
should be understood in the weaker of the two senses discussed, I explained that 
whatever it is to appreciate the normativity of truth for belief within doxastic deliberation, 
it doesn’t exclude the causal influence of something non-alethic on the belief. 
Appreciation of the norm, as I put it, need not involve constant conformity to it; rather it 
has to be some kind of recognition that the norm makes only truth relevant.  
Further, it seems plausible to say that whatever this recognition of the norm in 
question is, it need not happen on any conscious or articulate level. According to at least 
some theories of concept possession, having some concept is a matter of being able to 
sort instances of the concept from non-instances, or having one’s concept tokened in an 
appropriate set of the cases where it’s instantiated. It would be bizarre for a theory of 
concept possession to require a conscious appreciation of all the conceptual truths for a 
given concept. I may well have the concept of triangles, for example, without ever 
entertaining the particular conceptual truth that triangles are three-sided polygons. (I take 
it that this is true of most five-year-olds, given that they lack the concept of polygons.) If 
concept possession can’t require conscious consideration of the various conceptual truths 
about some concept, then it must be something less than this.  
It would be beyond the scope of this paper to try to say exactly what constitutes 
the awareness of the conceptual truths that comes along with possession of a concept. 
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What I mean to be showing, though, is that it’s something shy of conscious or explicit 
consideration of the truths in question. Recall that Shah’s explanation of transparency 
was roughly that in all cases of doxastic deliberation we exercise our concept of belief, 
and if we have the concept, we appreciate the conceptual truth about beliefs that requires 
the collapse that is transparency. This appreciation, we now see, will have to be 
constituted by something short of explicitly saying to oneself ‘beliefs are subject to a 
norm that prohibits believing propositions unless they’re true’. There’s no reason that my 
possessing and exercising the concept of belief should be taken to require this. If my 
possessing and exercising the concept of belief is to explain transparency, though, then it 
must come along with some kind of appreciation of this conceptual truth.  
Since the appreciation of the normativity of truth for belief that comes along with 
possesson of the concept need not be the explicit saying to oneself ‘truth is normative for 
belief’, or the constant conformity to the norm, it must instead be something that we 
make manifest in the management of our beliefs. Once we notice that appreciation of the 
normativity of truth for belief requires as little as it does, though, we can see that while 
Shah’s conceptual claim about belief would indeed be one way to explain it, the 
teleologist’s claims might suffice after all.  
Again, the resource that the teleologist needs here is an explanation of why in all 
cases of doxastic deliberation we appreciate the normativity of truth for belief, where 
appreciation of the norm is a matter of somehow making manifest an acceptance of it. 
She has given a story about why it’s the case that truth is exclusively normative for 
belief, and now needs a story about why we appreciate this in doxastic deliberation.  
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The explanation that the teleologist seems capable of offering is an explanation in 
the style of ‘it was to be expected’. If truth is normative for belief in the sense that the 
teleologist claims it is, then the very dispositions that Shah is going to say constitute the 
appreciation of the norm (the making manifest our acceptance of it) would be likely to 
show up in those folks who are forming beliefs, or at least in those of them who are 
experienced believers. Given that beliefs have the telos that they do, it’s reasonable to 
expect those who are forming and maintaining and modifying their beliefs to somehow 
pick up on this over time. Doing so is not a condition on possession of the concept of 
belief for the teleologist, but rather something that we would expect from relective, 
experienced believers. Doxastic deliberators appreciate the normativity of truth for belief, 
the teleologist will say then, because they exercise their concept of belief and recognize 
that those things their concept picks out tend to go well when they’re responsive to truth.  
Shah would no doubt reply here that because transparency is the appreciation of 
the normativity of truth for belief in all cases of doxastic deliberation, this explanation 
will not suffice since there’s nothing that requires doxastic deliberators to have picked up 
on this norm given that it’s grounded in the metaphysics of belief rather than the concept 
of belief. Transparency obtains in all cases of doxastic deliberation and nothing in the 
teleologist’s essentially metaphysical story can account for why in all these cases we 
would appreciate the unique normativity of truth for belief.  
While it’s not at all clear to me that the teleologist about beliefs has an adequate 
reply here short of offering some conceptual claim of her own, it does seem that the less 
Shah can require as coming along with the appreciation of the norm, the better the 
position the teleologist is in. 
CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
At the start of this paper, I set out to examine the phenomenon of transparency 
and to ask how it’s best explained. The first important claim I made was that the 
phenomenon of transparency ought to be understood in the weaker of the senses I 
distinguished: it can only be taken to reveal that we appreciate the normativity of truth for 
belief. In all cases of doxastic deliberation, we take only alethic considerations to be 
relevant in settling questions about whether to believe, but this need not involve only 
those considerations I take to be alethic actually influencing my belief causally. My lying 
partner example and the Kahneman and Tversky example were cases designed to show 
that this is so. 
 The next claim I made was that in light of this understanding of transparency (the 
explanandum in question) the teleologist has at least somewhat of a reply to Shah’s 
charge. By examining what it is on a teleological account for beliefs to be aimed at the 
truth, I tried to show that the teleologist has resources to make room for the fact that truth 
is uniquely normative for belief: truth is the unique aim of belief and that’s why only they 
are relevant in settling questions about whether to believe. The phenomenon of 
transparency does not tell in favor of Shah’s claims over the teleologist’s, then, simply 
because the teleologist delivers her normativity from a set of descriptive claims. Both 
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Shah and the teleologist can explain why it’s the case that truth is uniquely normative for 
beliefs. 
 If there’s anything that gives Shah’s explanation of transparency a leg up on the 
teleologist’s, then, it’s the fact that his explanation is conceptual rather than 
metaphysical. While I’ve started sketching a way that the teleologist might respond to 
this charge, I realize that filling it out convincingly would require me to say more. At the 
end of the day, then, my claims are relatively modest: I hope to have made explicit some 
features of the phenomenon of transparency that Shah fails to elucidate clearly in “How 
Truth Governs Belief”, and show that the teleologist’s competing explanation of the 
phenomenon is better than Shah seems to think, even if the claim he is perhaps most 
interested in, namely that there’s a conceptual connection between belief and truth, 
remains well motivated.  
 
42 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. “The Simulation Heuristic,” In D. Kahneman, P. Slovic 
and A. Tversky (eds.) Judgement under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. 201-208. New 
York: Cambridge University Press. 1982. 
 
Shah, N. “How Truth Governs Belief.” The Philosophical Review. 112:4. 447-82. 2003. 
 
